

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 232509
ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-10 L-03
ACDA-12 NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 SP-02 ICA-11 TRSE-00
DOE-15 NASA-01 NSC-05 SOE-02 OES-09 NTIE-00 /104 R

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-----128979 140222Z /14
P 132313Z SEP 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 232509

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, ETEL

SUBJECT: NATO SATCOM IV SPACE SEGMENT

TO ASSURE THAT OUR ALLIES FULLY UNDERSTAND IMPACT OF
NATO DECISION TO ISSUE ICB FOR NATO SATCOM IV SPACE
SEGMENT, REQUEST THAT YOU PROVIDE THEM WITH STATEMENT
ALONG FOLLOWING LINES. WE INTEND TO ENTER STATEMENT
INTO RECORD AT FALL NJCEC PLENARY DURING DISCUSSION OF
THIS ISSUE:

BEGIN STATEMENT

AFTER THE JULY 14, 1978 SPECIAL NJCEC MEETING, WE RE-
VIEWED THE IMPACT OF A DECISION BY NATO TO PROCEED WITH
ICB FOR THE NATO IV SPACE SEGMENT ON THE US GOVERNMENT'S
OFFER TO NATO TO JOIN THE DSCS III PROGRAM. INASMUCH
AS OUR CONCLUSIONS HAVE A POTENTIAL IMPACT ON INFRASTRUCT-
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PAGE 02 STATE 232509

URE FUNDS, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SHARE
THE RESULTS OF OUR REVIEW WITH YOU.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT AS A RESULT OF OUR SPECIAL MEETING,
THE NJCEC INVITED THE DG, NICSMA, TOGETHER WITH STC,
TO PREPARE AN OUTLINE SPECIFICATION THAT WOULD NOT
PRECLUDE THE DSCS III AS AN ELIGIBLE SOLUTION, AND WHICH

COULD FORM THE BASIS OF AN ICB FOR A NATO IV SPACE SEGMENT. IT WAS APPARENT THAT SOME OF OUR ALLIES HELD THE VIEW THAT THE DSCS III CONTRACTOR COULD BID THE DSCS III AT A COST COMPARABLE TO THE US OFFER, OR IF BIDS FOR THE NATO IV SATELLITES WERE MORE EXPENSIVE, NATO WOULD HAVE THE OPTION TO REVERT TO THE PREVIOUS US OFFER. TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO REVIEW BRIEFLY THE US GOVERNMENT OFFER AND TO EXPLAIN THE POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF AN ICB APPROACH TO IT.

AS WE POINTED OUT IN THE PAST, THE COST TO NATO OF JOINING THE DSC III PROGRAM WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 104 MILLION DOLLARS. FOR THAT AMOUNT OF MONEY, NATO WOULD RECEIVE TWO SATELLITES INCLUDING LAUNCH AND LAUNCH SERVICES, WOULD SHARE A THIRD SATELLITE THAT WOULD BE A COMMON SPARE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO, AND WOULD RECEIVE THE BENEFIT OF SAMSO MANAGEMENT SERVICES.

REALIZING, HOWEVER, THAT SOME NATIONS MIGHT WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN SATELLITE PRODUCTION, WE EXPANDED OUR OFFER TO INCLUDE ABOUT 25 PERCENT PRODUCTION SHARING OF THE DSCS III SATELLITE. FOR THIS OPTION, AN INCREASE OF SOME 10 TO 15 PERCENT IN PROGRAM COSTS WOULD BE NEEDED TO COVER PROCUREMENT, TEST AND INTEGRATION OF SUBSYSTEMS THAT WOULD BE PRODUCTION SHARED. ADDITIONALLY, SOME SAMSO COSTS WOULD BE INCURRED FOR ASSISTANCE TO NICSMA IN CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 232509

MANAGEMENT OF A PRODUCTION SHARED PROGRAM.

ONCE AN INVITATION FOR BID UNDER ICB IS RELEASED, THE US GOVERNMENT OFFERS ARE NO LONGER VALID. WE CANNOT SHOW FAVORITISM TOWARD ANY U.S. CONTRACTOR. WE MUST BE COMPLETELY IMPARTIAL. WHETHER US CONTRACTORS BID AS PRIME OR SUB, OR HOW THEY PROPOSE TO MEET THE ICB SPECIFICATIONS IS A MATTER FOR THE INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES TO DECIDE. WE CAN HAVE NO INFLUENCE OVER WHETHER A COMPANY WILL BID, WHAT IT WILL BID, OR THE COSTS IT WILL BID. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE DSCS III CONTRACTORS DECIDE TO BID THE NATO PROGRAM, THEY MAY OR MAY NOT BID THE DSCS III SPACE SEGMENT. IN ANY CASE, WE BELIEVE COSTS TO NATO WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN THOSE PROPOSED IN THE US GOVERNMENT OFFERS.

FOR US PRIME OR SUB CONTRACTORS, EXPORT LICENSES MUST BE OBTAINED. ADDITIONALLY, THE LAW PROVIDES THAT, FOR A SALE OF THIS TYPE, RECOUPMENT OF GOVERNMENT R AND D COSTS CAN ONLY BE REDUCED OR WAIVED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

THE PREVIOUS USG OFFER TO WAIVE RDT AND E RECOUPMENT AND TO PROVIDE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS) LAUNCH SERVICES AT FAVORABLE DOD RATES WILL NO LONGER BE VALID. NASA IS REQUIRED BY UNITED STATES CODE (USERS CHARGES STATUTE, 31 USC SECTION 483A) TO ESTABLISH A PRICING POLICY BASED ON REIMBURSEMENT FOR DIRECT (RECURRING) CHARGES AND AN AMORTIZED AMOUNT OF IN-DIRECT (NON-RECURRING) CHARGES. SPECIFIC PRICING POLICIES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED FOR SEVERAL CATEGORIES OF POTENTIAL USERS, INCLUDING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE OR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES. IF THE NATO SATCOM IV IS NOT IDENTIFIED AS A DOD COOPERATIVE PAYLOAD, THE APPLICABLE CHARGE COULD BE 2 TIMES MORE THAN THE DOD STS CHARGE. ALTHOUGH A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 STATE 232509

COULD BE NEGOTIATED DIRECTLY BETWEEN NASA AND A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ORGANIZATION FOR STS LAUNCH SERVICES, A SEPARATELY NEGOTIATED MOA WITH NASA WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY TO DEFINE SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

IN SUMMARY, WE WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR AGAIN THAT ONCE NATO DECIDES TO ISSUE AN ICB FOR THE NATO IV SPACE SEGMENT, THE US GOVERNMENT MUST FOLLOW PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES WITH RESPECT TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY THAT ARE IMPARTIAL. AN ICB APPROACH REVOKES PREVIOUS US GOVERNMENT OFFERS, INVALIDATES COST ESTIMATES, AND PRECLUDES REINSTITUTION OF DIRECT US GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN NATO IV PROCUREMENT. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT AN UNMODIFIED OR MODIFIED DSCS III SPACE SEGMENT WILL BE BID. ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS MUST RECEIVE EQUAL TREATMENT FROM NATO AND NATO NATIONS. FINALLY, WE CANNOT PREDICT HOW THE LOWEST QUALIFIED BID UNDER ICB WILL COMPARE WITH THE EXISTING US GOVERNMENT OFFER. BUT EVEN IF IT IS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER, WE SEE NO WAY TO REINSTITUTE THE PREVIOUS US GOVERNMENT OFFER, THUS REQUIRING NATO TO SPEND ADDITIONAL MILLIONS OF INFRASTRUCTURE ACCOUNTING UNITS THAT COULD MORE EFFECTIVELY BE APPLIED TO URGENT NATO PROJECTS. END OF STATEMENT. CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ALLIANCE, MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS, COMMUNICATION SATELLITES, BRIEFING MATERIALS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 sep 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE232509
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: MR. GRAY:LA
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780373-0278
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780970/aaaacfnstel
Line Count: 162
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 02ea5751-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 06 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1446362
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO SATCOM IV SPACE SEGMENT TO ASSURE THAT OUR ALLIES FULLY UNDERSTAND IMPACT OF NATO DECISION TO ISSUE ICB FOR NATO SATCOM IV SPAC
TAGS: ETEL, MILI, NATO
To: USNATO
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbcb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/02ea5751-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014